The Political Implications of Morocco/US Free Trade Agreement
Free trade agreements have been promoted at an unprecedented rate during the last decades. Many countries have chosen to engage in preferential trade agreements for economic considerations.
Source : https://www.marocafrik.com/english/The-Political-I...
Morocco’s interest in expanding a preferential access to the American market.This met with a similar interest on the part of the American administration in furthering regional economic cooperation.
However,various considerations account for such deals.The promotion of peace and stability in the Middle East, the war against terrorism, together with the issue of the Sahara were emerging issues high on both countries agendas.The Moroccan secretary of foreign affairs, Elfassi Lfihri has successfully negotiated a free trade agreement with his USA counterpart Trade Representative,Bob Zoellick.After eight rounds of negotiations, the proposal received congressional approval and an agreement was reached on March 2, 2004.On June 15, 2004 the US / Moroccan Free trade Agreement was signed in Washington DC. And it was not until January 1, 2006 that the agreement entered into force offering new opportunities to deepen existing relations.
The agreement had as an objective to reduce and eliminate barriers and boost trade and investment flows.It also comprised a set of arrangements favoring partners by extending tariff and non-tariff preferences. To reaffirm its open door policy, the US granted Morocco a special position among few countries.
The policy built upon the existing framework of political cooperation, which dates back to 1777 when the Sultan Sidi Muhammad Ben Abdullah announced his desire for friendship with America. This overture manifested in recognition of US’s independence and culminated in the concluding of The Treaty of Friendship in 1786, which was the longest unbroken treaty in US history. After decades of coldness, the relations restored some of its warmth during World War II and The Cold War when the US demonstrated a growing concern in Third World countries.
Morocco was integrated into American global alliance system for containing Soviet expansion in the Middle East and Africa. In fact, as an anticipatory precautious measure, the US sought to rally more allies into its camp. In this respect, it provided huge material, military and technical support to North African countries. Major aid programs involve “Point Four” and the “Mutual Security Plan” which the USA undertook to "bag its own share of Third World allies. Between 1945 and 1960, for example, total expenditures in economic assistance and military aid under the Mutual Program umbrella alone amounted to 84 billion dollars.
Recently,the US engaged in an ambitious project to negotiate preferential free trade agreements with Middle East countries to boost economic cooperation, a project going hand in hand with political and military intervention in the region’s affairs. However, the US restricted eligibility to such markets to countries that meet specific requirements with regard to economic liberalisation, peace prospects and the war against terrorism. The US’s policy headed towards establishing peace and stability in the Middle East and North Africa.
This message of economic integration aimed at achieving eventual normalization of relations between Arabs and Israel and attempted to stop Arab economic boycott of Israel and accept it as a partner. In recognition of its pivotal role in promoting peace and security in so a turbulent area well-known for its chronic instability, Morocco was deemed eligible and gained US confidence as a prospective peace partner who spared no effort to ensure a favorable climate to negotiate peace agreements between Israel and the Arab World. Morocco’s centrality as a long-standing and geo-strategic ally to US as well as its historical relations with Israel made it well-positioned for this role as a veteran mediator. Traditionally, Morocco was among the few Arab countries that had regular contacts with Israel and that was “ready to thaw the political freeze”. Diplomatic activities between the two countries were always on a high gear.
Economically speaking, the Moroccan government advanced an ambitious privatization program, encouraged investment in all sectors and brought about a series of important reforms. The US responded positively and offered political and economic support for Morocco.Such a position presented this moderate state as a role model for other developing countries that still hesitate in taking bold steps to implement economic reforms and trade liberalization, key ingredients of modernization and crucial determinants for enhancing development.This message was explicitly stated by Zoellick at the beginning of the negotiation in January 2003, (White, 2005/ 601) We hope that the administration's commitment to free trade with a leading modern Arab state sends a signal throughout a tempestuous region of America's support for tolerant and more prosperous Muslim societies.
On the one hand, and as a fervent opponent of terrorism, Morocco has waged a violent war against terrorism. For the US, the engagement of third world countries in economic deals with the West is the new weapon in the war on terrorism. Eventually, when countries involve in economic partnerships, there is more likeliness for peace and tolerance and partners tend to shun away from any conflict that would shake stability or affect business and investments negatively. Again, Morocco has been one of the more open partners with regard to human rights and democratization.
Throughout the last decades, Morocco has engaged in an ambitious democratic modern project based on strong commitments to shared values and political, economic and institutional reforms.The Bush Administration described the FTA with Morocco “as an effort to build strategic, economic, and political ties with a moderate,friendly regime in the region that will serve, in turn, as a model for other countries”, (White, 597-616).
In return, the Sahara issue was high on the list of Moroccan priorities. Morocco depends on these advanced relations with the US to get a strong lobbying in favor of Moroccan claims of sovereignty in exchange for regional autonomy.
The US’s support can help achieve a negotiated compromise to settle the Sahara dispute and the regional future.
The USA can make a big difference with regard to its hegemony and leadership.
In this respect, Morocco managed to obtain US military support:“Morocco could not sustain the war for any appreciable length of time, or remain as intransigent as it has, without the financial backing of Saudi Arabia and the military assistance of the United States and France”, (Thompson, 1984). Again, Morocco had considerable success attracting former US diplomats to its side.
The case of Robert M. Holley, not a former ambassador but still a diplomat whose 21-year state department career included postings in Morocco, involves a more extensive and lengthy lobbying effort on behalf of the kingdom. Holley, the director of the Moroccan American Center for Policy (MACP), has issued at least two strongly pro-Moroccan and anti-Polisario papers in recent years.( Pazzanita, 2011) In fact, Morocco uses economic agreements to serve a national cause, an environment in which Morocco enjoys an extensive lobbying on its behalf which sometimes amounts to a wall of silence with US turning a blind eye to the Saharan question.
Eventually, the rapid spread of preferential trade agreements is one of the most pressing issues which pose a big challenge to the multilateral trade system.
The US / Moroccan FTA sets a policy of ambitious objectives for partnerships that addresses trade issues from different perspectives where three main fields of activity overlap, namely the economic, political and the social.
However, in a global world characterized by high competitiveness, the pressing question is whether this historic deal will integrate Moroccan economy with the largest and most dynamic economy in the world.
whether Morocco as a third world country modestly forcing its way in a highly competitive world is qualified to cope with the changing rules of the game.Aspiring to achieve real partnerships which has the capacity to address vita lsectors within a comprehensive approach, state and non-state actors - who are involved in policy-making process - are required to play their part to influence choices about whether to emphasize preferential trade agreements or disregard them.In this context, they need to ensure that such deals seek lasting benefits for all partners through a non-discriminatorytrading and financial system. Again, such agreements should consider the local specifications of different partners without jeopardizing one’s own traditions and values.
All these concerns and others may account for why many practitioners continue to view free trade agreements somewhat skeptically.
References: 1. Pazzanita, G. Anthony, 6 October
2011, Issue 551, Africa: Morocco Versus Polisario in 2011* Copyright © 2011,
PAMBAZUKA NEWS Morocco versus Polisario in 2011
http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/76900 Ahearn, J. Raymond. Morocco-U.S.
Free Trade Agreement, CRS Report for Congress, Received through the CRS
Web/Order Code RS21464, Updated April 13, 2005 Free Trade With Morocco : A
Vital Step Toward Middle East Free Trade/Trade Facts/Office of the United States
Trade Representative www.ustr.gov, March 2, 2004 2. Thompson, Virginia; Adloff,
Richard. The Conflict in the Western Sahara. The Western Saharans: Background to
Conflict. (Dec., 1984), pp. 696-703Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable Damis, John. Conflict in Northwest Africa: The Western Sahara Dispute.
(Dec., 1984), pp. 696-703Published by: Cambridge University Press Ohaegbulam,
Ugboaja. Western Sahara: The Roots of a Desert War: Review by Tony Hodges. The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Dec., 1984), pp. 696-703 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable
URL:http://www.jstor.org/stable/160405 3. Wells, B. Sherrill. Long-Time Friends:
A History of Early U.S.-Moroccan Relations 1777-1787,
http://www.usembassy.ma/usmorrelations/historicalbgrnd.htm 4. White, W. Gregory,
Free Trade as a Strategic Instrument in the War on Terror?: The 2004 US-Moroccan
Free Trade Agreement, 3, Middle East Journal, Vol. 59, No. 4 (Autumn, 2005),
p.601, Published by: Middle East Institute Stable URL:http://www.jstor.org/stable/43301862. 5. Zingg, J. Paul. America and North Africa: A case study in the United States-Third World Relations, The History
Teacher, vol. 12, No. 2 (Feb, 1979), 254)ذ.سالم تالحوت,
اتفاقية التبادل الحر بين المغرب و أمريكا
ستجعل المغرب أكثر تفتحا على العالم, مسالك في
الفكر والسياسة والاقتصاد, العدد الثاني, 2004 7.
ذ.مصطفى الخلفي, اتفاقية التبادل الحر بين
المغرب و أمريكا المغرب المسار – الرهانات –
الأفاق , مسالك في الفكر والسياسة والاقتصاد,
العدد الثاني, 2004
Latifa Bousalham
Latifa Bousalham is a Moroccan student currently enrolled in a master program majoring in Moroccan-American Studies at Hassan II University/Mohammedia, Faculty of Humanities/Ben M’sik/Casablanca. She obtained her BA in English Literature at the same university in 1992. She has also been a secondary school teacher since 1998.
However,various considerations account for such deals.The promotion of peace and stability in the Middle East, the war against terrorism, together with the issue of the Sahara were emerging issues high on both countries agendas.The Moroccan secretary of foreign affairs, Elfassi Lfihri has successfully negotiated a free trade agreement with his USA counterpart Trade Representative,Bob Zoellick.After eight rounds of negotiations, the proposal received congressional approval and an agreement was reached on March 2, 2004.On June 15, 2004 the US / Moroccan Free trade Agreement was signed in Washington DC. And it was not until January 1, 2006 that the agreement entered into force offering new opportunities to deepen existing relations.
The agreement had as an objective to reduce and eliminate barriers and boost trade and investment flows.It also comprised a set of arrangements favoring partners by extending tariff and non-tariff preferences. To reaffirm its open door policy, the US granted Morocco a special position among few countries.
The policy built upon the existing framework of political cooperation, which dates back to 1777 when the Sultan Sidi Muhammad Ben Abdullah announced his desire for friendship with America. This overture manifested in recognition of US’s independence and culminated in the concluding of The Treaty of Friendship in 1786, which was the longest unbroken treaty in US history. After decades of coldness, the relations restored some of its warmth during World War II and The Cold War when the US demonstrated a growing concern in Third World countries.
Morocco was integrated into American global alliance system for containing Soviet expansion in the Middle East and Africa. In fact, as an anticipatory precautious measure, the US sought to rally more allies into its camp. In this respect, it provided huge material, military and technical support to North African countries. Major aid programs involve “Point Four” and the “Mutual Security Plan” which the USA undertook to "bag its own share of Third World allies. Between 1945 and 1960, for example, total expenditures in economic assistance and military aid under the Mutual Program umbrella alone amounted to 84 billion dollars.
Recently,the US engaged in an ambitious project to negotiate preferential free trade agreements with Middle East countries to boost economic cooperation, a project going hand in hand with political and military intervention in the region’s affairs. However, the US restricted eligibility to such markets to countries that meet specific requirements with regard to economic liberalisation, peace prospects and the war against terrorism. The US’s policy headed towards establishing peace and stability in the Middle East and North Africa.
This message of economic integration aimed at achieving eventual normalization of relations between Arabs and Israel and attempted to stop Arab economic boycott of Israel and accept it as a partner. In recognition of its pivotal role in promoting peace and security in so a turbulent area well-known for its chronic instability, Morocco was deemed eligible and gained US confidence as a prospective peace partner who spared no effort to ensure a favorable climate to negotiate peace agreements between Israel and the Arab World. Morocco’s centrality as a long-standing and geo-strategic ally to US as well as its historical relations with Israel made it well-positioned for this role as a veteran mediator. Traditionally, Morocco was among the few Arab countries that had regular contacts with Israel and that was “ready to thaw the political freeze”. Diplomatic activities between the two countries were always on a high gear.
Economically speaking, the Moroccan government advanced an ambitious privatization program, encouraged investment in all sectors and brought about a series of important reforms. The US responded positively and offered political and economic support for Morocco.Such a position presented this moderate state as a role model for other developing countries that still hesitate in taking bold steps to implement economic reforms and trade liberalization, key ingredients of modernization and crucial determinants for enhancing development.This message was explicitly stated by Zoellick at the beginning of the negotiation in January 2003, (White, 2005/ 601) We hope that the administration's commitment to free trade with a leading modern Arab state sends a signal throughout a tempestuous region of America's support for tolerant and more prosperous Muslim societies.
On the one hand, and as a fervent opponent of terrorism, Morocco has waged a violent war against terrorism. For the US, the engagement of third world countries in economic deals with the West is the new weapon in the war on terrorism. Eventually, when countries involve in economic partnerships, there is more likeliness for peace and tolerance and partners tend to shun away from any conflict that would shake stability or affect business and investments negatively. Again, Morocco has been one of the more open partners with regard to human rights and democratization.
Throughout the last decades, Morocco has engaged in an ambitious democratic modern project based on strong commitments to shared values and political, economic and institutional reforms.The Bush Administration described the FTA with Morocco “as an effort to build strategic, economic, and political ties with a moderate,friendly regime in the region that will serve, in turn, as a model for other countries”, (White, 597-616).
In return, the Sahara issue was high on the list of Moroccan priorities. Morocco depends on these advanced relations with the US to get a strong lobbying in favor of Moroccan claims of sovereignty in exchange for regional autonomy.
The US’s support can help achieve a negotiated compromise to settle the Sahara dispute and the regional future.
The USA can make a big difference with regard to its hegemony and leadership.
In this respect, Morocco managed to obtain US military support:“Morocco could not sustain the war for any appreciable length of time, or remain as intransigent as it has, without the financial backing of Saudi Arabia and the military assistance of the United States and France”, (Thompson, 1984). Again, Morocco had considerable success attracting former US diplomats to its side.
The case of Robert M. Holley, not a former ambassador but still a diplomat whose 21-year state department career included postings in Morocco, involves a more extensive and lengthy lobbying effort on behalf of the kingdom. Holley, the director of the Moroccan American Center for Policy (MACP), has issued at least two strongly pro-Moroccan and anti-Polisario papers in recent years.( Pazzanita, 2011) In fact, Morocco uses economic agreements to serve a national cause, an environment in which Morocco enjoys an extensive lobbying on its behalf which sometimes amounts to a wall of silence with US turning a blind eye to the Saharan question.
Eventually, the rapid spread of preferential trade agreements is one of the most pressing issues which pose a big challenge to the multilateral trade system.
The US / Moroccan FTA sets a policy of ambitious objectives for partnerships that addresses trade issues from different perspectives where three main fields of activity overlap, namely the economic, political and the social.
However, in a global world characterized by high competitiveness, the pressing question is whether this historic deal will integrate Moroccan economy with the largest and most dynamic economy in the world.
whether Morocco as a third world country modestly forcing its way in a highly competitive world is qualified to cope with the changing rules of the game.Aspiring to achieve real partnerships which has the capacity to address vita lsectors within a comprehensive approach, state and non-state actors - who are involved in policy-making process - are required to play their part to influence choices about whether to emphasize preferential trade agreements or disregard them.In this context, they need to ensure that such deals seek lasting benefits for all partners through a non-discriminatorytrading and financial system. Again, such agreements should consider the local specifications of different partners without jeopardizing one’s own traditions and values.
All these concerns and others may account for why many practitioners continue to view free trade agreements somewhat skeptically.
References: 1. Pazzanita, G. Anthony, 6 October
2011, Issue 551, Africa: Morocco Versus Polisario in 2011* Copyright © 2011,
PAMBAZUKA NEWS Morocco versus Polisario in 2011
http://pambazuka.org/en/category/features/76900 Ahearn, J. Raymond. Morocco-U.S.
Free Trade Agreement, CRS Report for Congress, Received through the CRS
Web/Order Code RS21464, Updated April 13, 2005 Free Trade With Morocco : A
Vital Step Toward Middle East Free Trade/Trade Facts/Office of the United States
Trade Representative www.ustr.gov, March 2, 2004 2. Thompson, Virginia; Adloff,
Richard. The Conflict in the Western Sahara. The Western Saharans: Background to
Conflict. (Dec., 1984), pp. 696-703Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable Damis, John. Conflict in Northwest Africa: The Western Sahara Dispute.
(Dec., 1984), pp. 696-703Published by: Cambridge University Press Ohaegbulam,
Ugboaja. Western Sahara: The Roots of a Desert War: Review by Tony Hodges. The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Dec., 1984), pp. 696-703 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable
URL:http://www.jstor.org/stable/160405 3. Wells, B. Sherrill. Long-Time Friends:
A History of Early U.S.-Moroccan Relations 1777-1787,
http://www.usembassy.ma/usmorrelations/historicalbgrnd.htm 4. White, W. Gregory,
Free Trade as a Strategic Instrument in the War on Terror?: The 2004 US-Moroccan
Free Trade Agreement, 3, Middle East Journal, Vol. 59, No. 4 (Autumn, 2005),
p.601, Published by: Middle East Institute Stable URL:http://www.jstor.org/stable/43301862. 5. Zingg, J. Paul. America and North Africa: A case study in the United States-Third World Relations, The History
Teacher, vol. 12, No. 2 (Feb, 1979), 254)ذ.سالم تالحوت,
اتفاقية التبادل الحر بين المغرب و أمريكا
ستجعل المغرب أكثر تفتحا على العالم, مسالك في
الفكر والسياسة والاقتصاد, العدد الثاني, 2004 7.
ذ.مصطفى الخلفي, اتفاقية التبادل الحر بين
المغرب و أمريكا المغرب المسار – الرهانات –
الأفاق , مسالك في الفكر والسياسة والاقتصاد,
العدد الثاني, 2004
Latifa Bousalham
Latifa Bousalham is a Moroccan student currently enrolled in a master program majoring in Moroccan-American Studies at Hassan II University/Mohammedia, Faculty of Humanities/Ben M’sik/Casablanca. She obtained her BA in English Literature at the same university in 1992. She has also been a secondary school teacher since 1998.
Source : https://www.marocafrik.com/english/The-Political-I...