Algeria Sowed Seeds of Hostage Crisis as It Nurtured Warlord -NYT

As the expert indicated it was a failure from the very beginning because the Algerians worked with the quixotic figure of Iyad Ag Ghali who was inherently unreliabale.The Algerians thought  that, like the Pakistani secret service the ISI did with the Taliban, that they could control the situation by dealing with Ansar Dine who was allied with the Algerian terrorist organisation, AQIM and its allies including Mujao. The deadly spectre of Islamist terrorism seemed to have held no fear for them.There have been persistant rumours that part of the Algerian secret service had links with AQIM and its predecessor the GSPC going back to the years of the civil war in the 1990's.
 
They had successfully controlled AQIM , though they did not eliminate it on Algerian soil. They may even have welcomed the fact that AQMI was moving many of its members to Mali. they also seem to have been bewitched by the mercurial persona of Iyad Ag Ghali himself ,as the NYT observes that he had been on both sides of everything including being Mali's consul general in Jeddah for three years.The Saudi link is also highly significant as its secret service has been heavily involved in Pakistan and Afghanistan for many years. Iyad Ag Ghali's role in the negotiations in the previous conflict between theTuareg and Malian forces obviously made him an attractive figure for the Algerians who thought he would play the same role again.However his relationship with Al Qaeda proved stronger than his links with Algeria.

This was a terrible miscalculation  and his decision to withdraw his offer of a ceasefire and throw in his forces with the very terrorists he said he was distancing himself from in the negotiations in Ougadougou ,has probably done irreperable damage to the Tuareg cause in Mali. The Malians also deeply distrust the MNLA as well. That the Algerians could have placed their faith in Iyad Ag Ghali whilst their own consular staff from Gao were being held hostage and were not  released is incredible.

The NYT notes that the tangled web of drugs and weapons trafficking and kidnapping merges with tribal conflicts and even personal ambitions.Iyad Ag Gahli wanted to head the Tuaregs and formed Ansar Dine when he was thwarted.An expert notes that the situation was being governed by two aspects; ideology and local logic. Algeria was deceived into thinking  that islamic fundamentalism and Sharia was less of a threat than the Tuareg  desire for the independence of Azawad and the creation of  a Tuareg homeland. Algeria feared that its own Tuareg would also respond to the call, although they have remained steadfastly loyal so far. When the  "Signed in Blood  Brigade" struck at the gas complex at In Amenas and followed it up with another attack on a gas pumping station Algeria's vast borders look very insecure. The operation was controlled by AQIM stalwart Mokhtar Belmokhtar.

As the NYT observes, Algeria may never enjoy the same levels of  internal security again for sometime.

After placing itself at the head of the Sahelian forces with CEMOC based in Tamanrasset, the Algerians refused to be involved in any military solution. It was feted by the west as key to the solution in Mali and the Sahel but all this fell apart when Iyad Ag Ghali and his forces advanced on Konna and headed South and France intervened because the very existence of Mali was at stake.

Too late the Algerians realised their error and stopped talking to Ansar Dine although the NYT observes that senior Algerians still think they can negotiate with elements of Ansar Dine . All of their negotiations so far have led to nothing and it is more likely that negotiations will be pursued by international bodies like the UN  and the AU. Having mounted an international intervention the West is unlikely  to leave the crisis resolution solely to  local regional bodies.Algerian regional diplomacy has lost much of its credibility