Morocco’s Engagement with the Sahel Community- Carnegie Foundation.
Dr Benjamin P. Nickels writes for The Carnegie Foundation that the consequences of the Arab Spring in the Sahel are more complex than previously thought. Transitions in North Africa may set the stage for new forms of security cooperation in the Sahel especially with regard to Mali.
Source : https://www.marocafrik.com/english/Morocco-s-Engag...
The meeting of the Community of Sahel-Saharan states (CEN-SAD) in January in N’djamena in Chad is such an opportunity and Morocco is likely to move towards taking command of the organisation.
Muammar Gaddafi was a key supporter of the African Union (AU) and CENSAD which grew to 28 members seeking economic union and cultural and political exchanges but the dictator’s death put it in limbo.
However the situation opened up possibilities for Morocco which is not a member of the AU, because of the conflict with Algeria over the Moroccan sahara. African states began lobbying for Morocco to revitalise CEN- SAD.
CEN – SAD is attractive to Morocco as no other member has the capacity to lead it and Algeria is not a member. It should give Morocco free reign to guide the organisation.Other potential leaders are occupied with their own regional organisations.
Algeria’s absence from CEN-SAD should allow Morocco free reign to guide the organization independent of its neighbor. Moreover, the Kingdom may enjoy novel forms of influence within a Regional Economic Community (REC ) which is based on the area where the Islamic Arab world and the African meet. Islam unites these diverse countries and CEN-SAD is the REC of all muslim majority African states, the Carnegie Foundation points out.
The leadership of CEN-SAD would allow Rabat to engage in a region where it has deep and direct security concerns. The bordering Sahel is a zone of illegal immigration; of illicit trafficking in weapons, arms, and people; and of operation and sanctuary for al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and a proliferating set of armed groups. These challenges are concern Morocco because illegal migrants settle in the country, more trafficking corrupts Saharawi youth, and Islamist terrorist attacks pose a threat to the country’s tourist hubs.
The Moroccan government adopted a new constitution in July 2011 that restates Morocco’s foreign policy priorities, with notable prominence given to sub-Saharan Africa. The Sahel is explicitly highlighted, and it follows only the Maghreb and the umma (and precedes the Mediterranean world) in the document’s listing of Morocco’s regional priorities. Morocco, the article says has an interest in adopting and adapting the structure of CEN- SAD which covers economic and cultural exchanges and the deployment of multinational forces for peacekeeping operations.
Last June, Rabat took the first step: hosting a CEN-SAD meeting aimed at revitalizing the organization and shifting its focus toward security. The upcoming N’djamena meeting should provide further insight into Morocco’s intentions and CEN-SAD’s prospects and direction the article reflects.
CEN-SAD may thin down to a more manageable ten members concentrating on its western regions rather than to the East with the possibility of coordinated action on Northern Mali. The article raises the question of whether Algeria would join a Moroccan led CEN-SAD and one would have to gauge the reaction of the AU and ECOWAS.
The January 2013 summit under the presidency of Chad will mark an advance, but CEN-SAD will remain hard pressed to make any intervention in the Mali crisis. Nonetheless, it may eventually find itself engaged there and in the Sahel more broadly.
The Arab Spring’s reverberations are full of contradictions and ironies. It may be that CEN-SAD’s founder, Gaddafi, had to die for the organization to live, and that the REC’s anchor state will shift from one of the AU’s strongest advocates, Libya, to its only non-member, Morocco.
The straight line from the Libya crisis to the Mali crisis is clear, but the ultimate meaning of the Arab Spring for peace and security in Africa remains to be seen, the Carnegie article concludes.
Muammar Gaddafi was a key supporter of the African Union (AU) and CENSAD which grew to 28 members seeking economic union and cultural and political exchanges but the dictator’s death put it in limbo.
However the situation opened up possibilities for Morocco which is not a member of the AU, because of the conflict with Algeria over the Moroccan sahara. African states began lobbying for Morocco to revitalise CEN- SAD.
CEN – SAD is attractive to Morocco as no other member has the capacity to lead it and Algeria is not a member. It should give Morocco free reign to guide the organisation.Other potential leaders are occupied with their own regional organisations.
Algeria’s absence from CEN-SAD should allow Morocco free reign to guide the organization independent of its neighbor. Moreover, the Kingdom may enjoy novel forms of influence within a Regional Economic Community (REC ) which is based on the area where the Islamic Arab world and the African meet. Islam unites these diverse countries and CEN-SAD is the REC of all muslim majority African states, the Carnegie Foundation points out.
The leadership of CEN-SAD would allow Rabat to engage in a region where it has deep and direct security concerns. The bordering Sahel is a zone of illegal immigration; of illicit trafficking in weapons, arms, and people; and of operation and sanctuary for al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and a proliferating set of armed groups. These challenges are concern Morocco because illegal migrants settle in the country, more trafficking corrupts Saharawi youth, and Islamist terrorist attacks pose a threat to the country’s tourist hubs.
The Moroccan government adopted a new constitution in July 2011 that restates Morocco’s foreign policy priorities, with notable prominence given to sub-Saharan Africa. The Sahel is explicitly highlighted, and it follows only the Maghreb and the umma (and precedes the Mediterranean world) in the document’s listing of Morocco’s regional priorities. Morocco, the article says has an interest in adopting and adapting the structure of CEN- SAD which covers economic and cultural exchanges and the deployment of multinational forces for peacekeeping operations.
Last June, Rabat took the first step: hosting a CEN-SAD meeting aimed at revitalizing the organization and shifting its focus toward security. The upcoming N’djamena meeting should provide further insight into Morocco’s intentions and CEN-SAD’s prospects and direction the article reflects.
CEN-SAD may thin down to a more manageable ten members concentrating on its western regions rather than to the East with the possibility of coordinated action on Northern Mali. The article raises the question of whether Algeria would join a Moroccan led CEN-SAD and one would have to gauge the reaction of the AU and ECOWAS.
The January 2013 summit under the presidency of Chad will mark an advance, but CEN-SAD will remain hard pressed to make any intervention in the Mali crisis. Nonetheless, it may eventually find itself engaged there and in the Sahel more broadly.
The Arab Spring’s reverberations are full of contradictions and ironies. It may be that CEN-SAD’s founder, Gaddafi, had to die for the organization to live, and that the REC’s anchor state will shift from one of the AU’s strongest advocates, Libya, to its only non-member, Morocco.
The straight line from the Libya crisis to the Mali crisis is clear, but the ultimate meaning of the Arab Spring for peace and security in Africa remains to be seen, the Carnegie article concludes.
Source : https://www.marocafrik.com/english/Morocco-s-Engag...