Can the jihadists be stopped? The Economist
Hectic diplomacy and preparations for a UN-backed war against a branch of al-Qaeda in the Sahara desert are both proceeding a pace says The Economist.
Source : https://www.marocafrik.com/english/Can-the-jihadis...
Ecowas and the AU has to complete a plan for its deployment in Mali to the UN Security Council by the end of the month.Negotiations are afoot to separate Ansar Dine from Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb(AQIM) the Movement of Oneness and Jihad (Mujao) and its allies. Even if this separation can be achieved the military operation is unlikely to start for several months despite the French Defence Minister saying it would take a week, the article
points out.
Ecowas is providing a force of just over 3,000 and the EU and the USA will provide intellegence including drones and logistics with financing. Ecowas is ill equipped to fight Al Quaeda on its own The Economist notes and may require further troops,indeed Ecowas had discussed increasing the force to over 5,000. The intervention is not expected to take place before next year despite the UN's expression of urgency.
No one is sure of the outcome and although the terrorist enclaves of Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal may indeed be taken, rooting out the terrorists from nothern Mali's vast and rugged terrain is less sure. it is also not sure that Mali's government and the projunta group will hold together. The intervention is fraught with danger but all parties,theUS ,EU,African Union and Ecowas are all adamant that action is necessary although they are also hoping that dialogue will work, but not of course with the terrorists.
The UN is under pressure because of the suffering of Mali's population in the north where they are suffering under the barbaric imposition of amputations,beatings,stoning to death and executions in the name of sharia imposed by terrorists along with a host of human rights infringements such as the ethnic cleansing of a large number of Malian refugees and the destruction of revered ancient Sufi shrines.Secondly, there is the concern that Islamists and al-Qaeda will entrench themselves and the vast area will become a haven for planning and executing international terrorism.
The rotten state of the Mali regime which culminated in the coup by the Junta and led to the take over ofthe north by the rebels is not encouraging as the government of national unity is hopelessly divided. the ethnic divisions between the Tuareg in the north which are 10 per cent of the population remain.Agreements with the Tuareg in the past were not honoured and they seized their opportunity with the fall of Gaddafi to return heavily armed to fight for their cause.Their is an unresolved ethnic and racialdivide between the Tuareg and the Africans, The Economist says.
The Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) declared independence in the north and was then pushed out of the cities by Ansar Dine working with AQIM and Mujao.Ansar Dine led by Iyad Ag ghali is in Kidal and Mujao is in Gao with AQIM in Timbuktu.
On 6 November Ansar Dine met with Ecowas negotiator President Blaise Campaore and has apparently agreed to allow aidconvoys into the north andto distance itself from AQIM and Mujao. They have agreed to restrict the imposition of Sharia to their own area and not the whole of Mali.
Central to the negotiations is Ansar Dine's leader Iyad ag Ghali . A Tuareg native of Kidal in his 50s, he has a long and controversial record as both power broker and trouble maker in northern Mali, The Economist says. He has led rebellions and arranged the release of Western hostages; some Frenchhostages are still in islamist hands across the Sahara. Mr Ag Ghali may also be wary of the Arab jihadists’ influence on the largely Tuareg Ansar Dine and theMNLA. President Compaoré perhaps believes that he can be wooed away from Mujao and al-Qaeda.
But some say Mr Ag Ghali’s influence is waning and that his defection from the jihadist front would not make much difference. He founded Ansar Dine only, it is said, after failing to win the leadership of the Tuaregs’ MNLA, which is relatively secular. He may also have been embittered by his failure to win the chieftaincy of the Kidal Tuareg tribal confederacy. Despite Ansar Dine’s brutal application of sharia law, doubt has been cast on Mr Ag Ghali’s own piety. His current Salafist bent may date from a recent stint as a Malian diplomat in Saudi Arabia. The Economist observes.Before that he was said to enjoy a whisky, a charge his people deny. Cables published by WikiLeaks say he once walked into the American embassy in Bamako and asked for help to fight against al-Qaeda in the north. Timbuktu's mayor suggestsitsalla front and they just want territory to hide hostagesand to continue drug smuggling. money may be the deciding factor in dealing with the north as unemployment is high and AQIM pays money to guarantee support. it is suggestedthat Ansar Dine came to AQIM for money as it was in financial difficulties.
Whatever Ansar Dine's situation,The Economist concludes, Al Qaeda 's influence in the region is growing and it will take a well thought out military and political strategy which will take time.
points out.
Ecowas is providing a force of just over 3,000 and the EU and the USA will provide intellegence including drones and logistics with financing. Ecowas is ill equipped to fight Al Quaeda on its own The Economist notes and may require further troops,indeed Ecowas had discussed increasing the force to over 5,000. The intervention is not expected to take place before next year despite the UN's expression of urgency.
No one is sure of the outcome and although the terrorist enclaves of Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal may indeed be taken, rooting out the terrorists from nothern Mali's vast and rugged terrain is less sure. it is also not sure that Mali's government and the projunta group will hold together. The intervention is fraught with danger but all parties,theUS ,EU,African Union and Ecowas are all adamant that action is necessary although they are also hoping that dialogue will work, but not of course with the terrorists.
The UN is under pressure because of the suffering of Mali's population in the north where they are suffering under the barbaric imposition of amputations,beatings,stoning to death and executions in the name of sharia imposed by terrorists along with a host of human rights infringements such as the ethnic cleansing of a large number of Malian refugees and the destruction of revered ancient Sufi shrines.Secondly, there is the concern that Islamists and al-Qaeda will entrench themselves and the vast area will become a haven for planning and executing international terrorism.
The rotten state of the Mali regime which culminated in the coup by the Junta and led to the take over ofthe north by the rebels is not encouraging as the government of national unity is hopelessly divided. the ethnic divisions between the Tuareg in the north which are 10 per cent of the population remain.Agreements with the Tuareg in the past were not honoured and they seized their opportunity with the fall of Gaddafi to return heavily armed to fight for their cause.Their is an unresolved ethnic and racialdivide between the Tuareg and the Africans, The Economist says.
The Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) declared independence in the north and was then pushed out of the cities by Ansar Dine working with AQIM and Mujao.Ansar Dine led by Iyad Ag ghali is in Kidal and Mujao is in Gao with AQIM in Timbuktu.
On 6 November Ansar Dine met with Ecowas negotiator President Blaise Campaore and has apparently agreed to allow aidconvoys into the north andto distance itself from AQIM and Mujao. They have agreed to restrict the imposition of Sharia to their own area and not the whole of Mali.
Central to the negotiations is Ansar Dine's leader Iyad ag Ghali . A Tuareg native of Kidal in his 50s, he has a long and controversial record as both power broker and trouble maker in northern Mali, The Economist says. He has led rebellions and arranged the release of Western hostages; some Frenchhostages are still in islamist hands across the Sahara. Mr Ag Ghali may also be wary of the Arab jihadists’ influence on the largely Tuareg Ansar Dine and theMNLA. President Compaoré perhaps believes that he can be wooed away from Mujao and al-Qaeda.
But some say Mr Ag Ghali’s influence is waning and that his defection from the jihadist front would not make much difference. He founded Ansar Dine only, it is said, after failing to win the leadership of the Tuaregs’ MNLA, which is relatively secular. He may also have been embittered by his failure to win the chieftaincy of the Kidal Tuareg tribal confederacy. Despite Ansar Dine’s brutal application of sharia law, doubt has been cast on Mr Ag Ghali’s own piety. His current Salafist bent may date from a recent stint as a Malian diplomat in Saudi Arabia. The Economist observes.Before that he was said to enjoy a whisky, a charge his people deny. Cables published by WikiLeaks say he once walked into the American embassy in Bamako and asked for help to fight against al-Qaeda in the north. Timbuktu's mayor suggestsitsalla front and they just want territory to hide hostagesand to continue drug smuggling. money may be the deciding factor in dealing with the north as unemployment is high and AQIM pays money to guarantee support. it is suggestedthat Ansar Dine came to AQIM for money as it was in financial difficulties.
Whatever Ansar Dine's situation,The Economist concludes, Al Qaeda 's influence in the region is growing and it will take a well thought out military and political strategy which will take time.
Source : https://www.marocafrik.com/english/Can-the-jihadis...